My dissertation is titled, "Desire and the Birth of the Self: What Plato's Theory of Erōs Can Tell Us About Value."
Abstract: Desire is perplexing due to its vexing marriage of our activity and passivity. Further, desires exert an attractive pressure on us— what I call imperatival force— which we take to figure in desire’s role in the explanation of our action. Some have thought Plato was the first to hold that desires are appearances of goodness, thereby explaining both our passivity and their imperatival force. This Perceptual Model remains attractive to many today. My dissertation argues that the Perceptual Model fails as a model of desire, and that Plato’s view differs importantly from it. In the Symposium, Plato explains imperatival force in terms of the attractiveness of the self we recognize in a desired object. When we value, we identify ourselves with another object. This makes sense of desire’s role in our practical identities. I argue Plato offers a cognitive theory of desire for the good (Erōs), explicated as correct belief (orthē doxa), but also that cognitive states are ultimately explicated as evaluative acts. Plato offers a theory of valuing that informs his understanding of cognition. I find this view reaffirmed in the Republic. While his view that conation and cognition are the same principle is not viable by modern lights, Plato’s theory of the structure of valuing attitudes provides insight into how valuing differs from perception and belief. Desires stem from valuing attitudes: sui generis, reflexive attitudes in which we do something to ourselves, namely create our selves. On this account we are both active and passive.
Further research projects include further work on distinguishing valuing attitudes from perception and belief; examining whether there is a meaningful difference for Plato between perceptual doxa and evaluative doxa; and exploring the nature of Alcibiades’ self-deception as a form of epistemic akrasia in Plato’s Symposium.
In contemporary ethics, I am currently working issues concerning the relation between the the affective state, or emotion (a passive condition), of love, and what we are doing when we love someone (an active condition).
Abstract: Desire is perplexing due to its vexing marriage of our activity and passivity. Further, desires exert an attractive pressure on us— what I call imperatival force— which we take to figure in desire’s role in the explanation of our action. Some have thought Plato was the first to hold that desires are appearances of goodness, thereby explaining both our passivity and their imperatival force. This Perceptual Model remains attractive to many today. My dissertation argues that the Perceptual Model fails as a model of desire, and that Plato’s view differs importantly from it. In the Symposium, Plato explains imperatival force in terms of the attractiveness of the self we recognize in a desired object. When we value, we identify ourselves with another object. This makes sense of desire’s role in our practical identities. I argue Plato offers a cognitive theory of desire for the good (Erōs), explicated as correct belief (orthē doxa), but also that cognitive states are ultimately explicated as evaluative acts. Plato offers a theory of valuing that informs his understanding of cognition. I find this view reaffirmed in the Republic. While his view that conation and cognition are the same principle is not viable by modern lights, Plato’s theory of the structure of valuing attitudes provides insight into how valuing differs from perception and belief. Desires stem from valuing attitudes: sui generis, reflexive attitudes in which we do something to ourselves, namely create our selves. On this account we are both active and passive.
Further research projects include further work on distinguishing valuing attitudes from perception and belief; examining whether there is a meaningful difference for Plato between perceptual doxa and evaluative doxa; and exploring the nature of Alcibiades’ self-deception as a form of epistemic akrasia in Plato’s Symposium.
In contemporary ethics, I am currently working issues concerning the relation between the the affective state, or emotion (a passive condition), of love, and what we are doing when we love someone (an active condition).